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6
Children's play interests,
representation, and activity
K. ANN RENNINGER

If you were to watch two 3-year-old children playing with trains, the first
child could well be linking the cars of the train together, at the same time
keeping an eye on the small colored blocks across the way, to which she
then drives the train and proceeds to load its cars. The second child
might also be linking the cars' couplers, but instead pulls the engine
forcefully causing the cars to fly off the ground before they start to
unhinge at the couplers and crash. In both instances, the children are
employing a particular set of actions with essentially the same play object. 1 They both know that trains can be hooked together, and their
actions suggest that they probably know a fair amount about trains - the
engine is used to pull cars, the cars link together to form a line, the
wheels enable the train to move forward, the cars can be used for carrying loads. There are still more things these two children could (and, in
fact, may) do with the trains. (They could organize the cars by type, they
could build a railroad track for the train using big blocks, they could
issue tickets for a ride, etc.) Some of these actions may not appear for
weeks, some of them may never appear - at least in train play.
It is the thesis of this chapter that the way in which children play with
play objects reflects what they represent to themselves as potential actions for play with these objects and may serve to gate information available to them in their subsequent play activity. In particular, the chapter
focuses on aspects of young children's identified interests, or stored
knowledge and value, for the play objects in their nursery school class.
Findings from two studies conducted on the same sample of children will
be used as the basis for this discussion of the role of individually identified interests and noninterests in children's representation of possibilities for action and their subsequent engagement with play objects.
In the first study, a combined naturalistic-experimental methodology
was employed to evaluate the effect of interest on attention and memory
of 3-year-old children. In the second study, the naturalistic component
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of the first study was examined in more depth. In this study the play
actions of each child in free play were evaluated as a function of the
value (interest, noninterest) of the play object, the affordances of that
play object generally, and the gender of the child. Discussion of both
studies focuses on the interest-representation-activity relation, the role
of specific content in representation, and the implications of individual
variation in interests for understanding children's development.
Interest, a subject variable .

Interest is here conceptualized as involving elements of both knowledge
and value. Knowledge refers to information about classes of objects and
events in a given domain that the child has stored from past experience
with instances of those objects and events. Value also refers to information
that the child has stored from previous experience with objects and events
in a given domain ; however, rather than information about the objects
and events themselves, it is information about the relationship between
the objects and events and the self (Mead, 1934). Value thus refers to that
which underlies the feelings children bring to continued involvement with
the objects and events in a given domain (Vygotsky, 1967).
Operationally, a child identified as having an interest in trains will play
with trains more frequently than with other objects, might fashion a train
out of blocks, and while pushing a boat, may announce that it is "on the
railroad track." In the nursery school, children's interests are thought to
be reflected in the degree to which children maintain attention over time
to objects. As Norman ( 1976) has pointed out, differentia.l attention of
this sort bears a reciprocal relationship to memory. Sustained attention
affects the ease and likelihood with which objects will be encoded in
memory; knowledge and value as long-term memory structures direct
and sustain attention.
Historically, experimental psychological research on memory and attention has had two traditions. One, heavily influenced by if not originating with Ebbinghaus (1885/1914), has generally focused on stimulus
variables. A second, dating from the very earliest experimental research
on attention (Bessel, 1823) and strongly reinforced by Bartlett's ( 1932)
studies of remembering has focused on subject variables.
The "Ebbinghaus" tradition was founded on the notion that psychological research should parallel the work of the natural sciences by developing techniques that guaranteed maximum experimental objectivity. As
Ebbinghaus described the basis for his work:
We must try in experimental fashion to keep as constant as possible those circumstances whose influence on retention and reproduction is known or suspected,
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and then ascertain whether that is sufficient. The material must be so chosen that
decided differences of interest are, at least to appearances, excluded. (p. 12)

Ebbinghaus, in other words, realized that interest might exert an
important influence on memory process. Rather than choose to study
this influence, he chose to rule it out by employing nonsense stimuli
that would presumably be equally interesting or uninteresting for all
subjects and presented the stimuli under highly controlled conditions.
Rather than subject variables, the stimuli themselves and stimulus variables such as order, frequency, and type of presentation became the
focus of his research - a legacy that continues to influence many current investigators.
The "Bartlett" tradition, on the other hand, concentrated on the subject and on the subject as an individual. Thus, Bartlett felt that the study
of meaningful material was essential to an understanding of the nature
of memory as it functions in everyday life. As he suggested,
because process and course of recall are inevitably bound up with the kind of
material that has to be learned, I have discarded nonsense syllable material. ...
The dissolving power of modern research seems to have split Memory into a
number of variously related functions .... Remembering is not a completely
independent function, entirely distinct from perceiving, imaging, or even from
constructive thinking, but it has intimate relations with them all. (pp. 11-12)

As a result, Bartlett chose to focus his investigations on "the conditions
of response that have to be considered as resident within the organism,"
that is, in the subject.
With the transition to cognitive psychology (e.g., Berlyne, 1960;
Broadbent, 1958; Bruner, Goodenow, & Austin, 1956; Hebb, 1949;
Hunt, 1965; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Triesman, 1960) the two
traditions of research on attention and memory became better integrated in a subject-stimulus interactionism. For example, Moray's ( 1959)
use of the subject's name in shadowing experiments illustrated, at least in
a limited way, that individual differences exist in information processing.
Gray and Wedderburn's ( 1960) introduction of meaningful material in
dichotic listening tasks demonstrated that meaning had to be taken into
account in any analysis of processing mechanisms. Findings of this sort,
together with the reemergence of a concern with cognitive development
(Flavell, 1963; Piaget, 1954), eventually led to cognitive informationprocessing models of memory and attention in which performance was
understood in terms of both conceptually driven (top-down) processes
organized in relation to the subject's knowledge system and data-driven
(bottom up) processes organized in relation to stimulus variables (Lindsay & Norman, 1976; Neisser, 1966; Norman, Rumelhart, & the LNR
Research Group, 1975).
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This focus on the interaction between stimulus and subject variables
led to a shift from linear, single-task research models to multidimensional, multitask methods. Such methods permit both analysis of individual differences in the subject and for the study of relationships between
these individual differences and performance across tasks. As Mostofsky
( 1970) noted, attention in particular requires multidimensional analysis
for it involves the attentional process, the attentive subject, and the
attention-getting stimulus. Similarly, Jenkins's ( 1979) tetrahedral research model goes even further by addressing the additional need to
focus on subject variables in relation to orienting tasks (directions, instructions, etc.), criteria! tasks (recall, recognition, etc.), and materials
(psychological organization, psychological sequence, etc.) across similar
problem-solving contexts. This need has also been touched on in discussion by Bransford (1979); Brown (1982); Hasher and Zacks (1979); Hunt
(1978); Kahneman (1973); and Wellman and Somerville (1980).
Interest is only one of several subject variables to which Jenkins ( 1979)
refers in his tetrahedral model. He also categorizes abilities, knowledge,
and purposes as subject variables, and observes that investigators of subject variables have typically studied "a single paradigm of acquisition, a
fixed body of material, a single dependent measure" (p. 432). The present conceptualization of interest is not intended to describe interest as a
paradigm, as a fixed body of material, or as a single dependent measure.
Instead, interest is conceptualized as reflecting the stored knowledge and
value of an individual's prior engagements, and the representation requisite to this activity. Among adults, interests are thus assumed to take the
form of a particular pattern of questioning or challenge setting which
may but does not necessarily have to be described by a specific domain.
With young children, on the other hand, it appears that the challenge
setting and possibilities for action in which they engage are more readily
identified with particular play objects. Thus, although train is the object
with which interest is identified, it is not the object train that is "interest,"
rather, train is the content of the activity. Interest is the individual's
cognitive and affective engagement with intended objects of interest. It is
thought to vary among individuals and to serve as an organizer of individual activity. As such, interest involves perception of possibilities for action, representation of these possibilities to the self, and the setting, resolving, and resetting of challenges with that object.

Interest, as individually varying psychological state
In this section, literature specific to the study of interest is reviewed
briefly, to provide an understanding of the possibilities afforded by study
of interest as a subject variable and as one approach to describing varia-
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tion between individuals in development. The study of interest has a
long, if uneven, history in psychology. The importance of interest for
study of attention and subsequent recall was noted at least as early as
1840 by Goethe (1914) in his classic analysis of color perception, and
continued to be discussed among psychologists throughout the 19th and
early 20th centuries. It virtually disappeared from the literature in the
1930s when "consciousness" and "attention" began to be eschewed as
constructs relevant to psychological explanation and has only recently
resurfaced as a "hot topic" for cognitive psychologists (Hidi & Baird,
1988). This renewed interest in interest appears to stem from at least
four sources: increased attention to subject variables as potential influences on the way in which an orienting response is interpreted (Bransford, 1979; Brown, 1982; Jenkins, 1979); attention to individual differences across a variety of domains (Dillon 1985; Dillon & Schmeck 1983);
detailing of task affordances (Gibson, 1979) and domain-specific knowledge (Chi, 1978); and a concurrent concern with identifying and understanding affect, emotion, and value in development (Mandler, 1975).
Generally speaking, conceptualizations of interest can be organized in
terms of their orientation with respect to two characteristics: (a) focus on
interests as a function of individual differences or on interest as a universal characteristic of human beings; and (b) conceptualization of interests
as a trait or interest as a psychological state. Contemporary discussions
have tended to focus on interest either as a trait stressing individual differences, or as a psychological state ignoring individual differences. Probably
the most influential approach has been the individual difference-trait
approach of psychometrics (Strong & Feder, 1961).
The psychometric approach, which uses quantitative indices to evaluate
individual interest traits, evolved in the 1920s with the vocationalguidance movement. Within the context of this movement, employeeemployment fit became the focus of study (see Fryer, 1931). Psychological
research was oriented toward identifying personal traits through matching people to jobs that better suited their particular interests.
Another more recent approach to study of interest, exemplified by
Izard ( 1977, 1979), has focused on observable behaviors characteristic of
interest as a psychological state. This "interest expression" is identified
through coding facial movement and is conceived of as a basic positive
emotion presumed to provide motivation for facilitating cognitive and
motor processes. In general, this approach has focused on the universal
qualities of interest as a psychological state.
By contrast, early conceptualizations of interest focused on interest as
a psychological state, which varied as a function of individual differences
in experience. These conceptualizations first described interest solely in
terms of experience and gradually became more elaborate, describing
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interest in terms of individual knowledge and value, both of which were
thought to be rooted in experience. Theorists involved in this development included: Baldwin (1897, 1906, 1911); Dewey (1913, 1916); James
(1890); Thorndike (1935), Piaget (1940), and Vygotsky (1967).
James (1890) discussed interest in terms of the organization of
expenence:
Millions of items of the outward order are present to my senses which never
properly enter into my experience. Why? Because they have no interest for me.
My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I notice shape my
mind - without selective interest, experience is utter chaos. Interest alone gives
accent and emphasis, light, and shade, background and foreground - intelligible
perspective, in a word. (vol. l, p. 402)

James's notions of perceptual learning foreshadowed the Gibsonian
(Gibson, 1966, 1979) argument that practice schools attention to distinctive features. James's view, however, was even broader than Gibson's in
that he felt not only practice, but interest, also improved a subject's
ability to discriminate. Thus, interest was described by James as "a sharpener of discrimination alongside of practice" (vol. 1, p. 515). The effect
that James associated with interest was that of molding the individual's
experience.
Baldwin ( 1911) took a different approach in his discussion of interest.
He described it in terms of the activities in which an individual engaged.
Interest was described as a function of both knowledge of and involvement with an activity. Thus, for Baldwin, both cognitive structures that
the child brought to activity in the world and the competence the child
experiences in action and its accompanying affect characterized interest.
In his discussion of interests, Dewey ( 1916) elaborated on this relationship between interest and competence in action by suggesting that interest was in the material. He labeled the worth of materials in continuously
engaging activity as their interest value. Dewey advised teachers to link
new material with the child's purposes, to "discover objects and modes of
action, which are connected with present powers. The function of this
material in engaging activity and carrying it on consistently and continuously is its interest" (p. 149). 2
Thus, Dewey felt children could only act on tasks that were within
their ."present power," which included both ability level and interests.
The teacher who tried to create "an interest" in something which was not
"of interest" to the child would probably be unsuccessful.
Thorndike (1935) expanded on these discussions. A student of James,
he spoke of interest as the past experience of a person that acts as a
tendency to "cause attention, practice, satisfaction or success, and so
increased ability" (p. 45). For him both the motivational value as well as
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the competence involved in sustained attention were important components of interest.
This affective aspect of interest was also stressed by Vygotsky ( 1967) in
his critique of play theories. He described interest as a need of the child
in activity and argued for more attention to subject variables generally
and interest as a reflection of the child's commitment in action more
specifically:
... the trouble with a number of theories of play lies in their tendency to intellectualize the problem .... I think that the mistake of a large number of accepted
theories is their disregard for the child's needs - taken in the broadest sense
from inclinations to interest, as needs of an intellectual nature - or, more briefly,
the disregard of everything that can come under the category of incentives and
motives for action. (pp. 538-539)

Finally, Piaget ( 1940) brought the cognitive and motivational components of interest together while also linking interest to the acts of mental
assimilation which construct experience.
Interest is the proper orientation for every act of mental assimilation .... [It]
commences with the beginnings of psychological life and plays an essential role in
the development of sensorimotor intelligence. But with the development of intuitive thought interests multiply and differentiate and give rise to a progressive
dissociation between the energizing mechanisms that imply interest and the values
interest engenders. (p. 340) 3

Taken together, the early theorists suggest that interest organizes experience as a function of both knowledge and value. Embedded in these
discussions are suggestions that: (a) interest schools attention; (b) interest
organizes experience; (c) interest is reflected in the task (play object,
idea, text, etc.); (d) experience gates information stored in memory; and
(e) different types of experience gate what gets stored in memory. Underlying these discussions is an assumption that individuals vary in their
experience and interest.
In contrast, most recent discussions of interest have tended to elaborate interests as universal psychological states. These discussions have
primarily had two focuses: (a) interest as affect or emotion (e.g., Izard,
1977, 1979), and (b) the "interestingness" of the text (or, more generally,
tasks) with which the subject engages. In his work on interest, Izard has
been primarily concerned with the affective content of interest. Findings
from his laboratory suggest that 2- to 8-month-old infants differentiate
between stimuli as a function of interest, suggesting that interest is a
significant predictor of visual fixation (Langsdorf, Izard, Rayias, &
Hembree, 1983).
Research on interestingness, on the other hand, is focused on ways in
which text can be modified to enhance interest. Findings from these
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studie indicate that individuals will attend to (Garner, Gillingham, &
White, l 989), and recall both narrative and expository text (Hidi &
Baird, 1986; 1988) as well as sentences (Anderson 1982; Anderson, Mason, & Shirey, 1984) that create a positive valence for the reader. The
aspects of context that have been manipulated to contribute to interestingness include: characterization, plot, theme, and setting (Anderson,
Shirey, Wilson, & Fielding 1986). In addition to manipulation of context, structural features of texts uch a insertions, elaborations, and
seductive detail have been employed to increase the interestingness of
text (Hidi & Baird 1988; Garner et al., 1989).
Substantial effects of interest on both subject fixation and comprehenion provide powerful arguments for continuing to research subject interest and the interestingness of text. Such research provide specific
information about subjects and texts, respectively, and, as such, comribute to ways in which environments and texts can be organized. However, this research doe not addre · the interdependence of the individual child's re pon e and features of the text or task. For purposes of
application in particular, con ideration of subject and task interdependence i important because it is this interaction that pecifies the way in
which information i processed by the individual. Such daca are potentially useful in remediating children's "faulty rules" (Ginsburg, 1977)
mapping the range of individual variance in a variety of aspects of learning, and addressing individual variation in children's developmenc. ocu · on particular su~ject-task interaction ( y tern, or activity) that incorporates the individual subject's understanding of task as a function of
experience (R goff & Misrry, 1985) not only facilitates evaluation of
contextual effects of both ubject and tasks as independenl influences
on learning, but provides a lens for understanding the respective contributions of each to the other as well.
One approach co the study of subject-task interaction involves controlling for individual differences between children with respect to the variables under study. Ln the present studies, differences between children
with respect to the content of their intere ts was expected based on
findings from psychometric studies of interest indicating that interests
vary across individual . On the other hand that each individual could be
identified as having an intere t further suggested that the discu ion of
universal characteristics of interestingness as an influence on comprehenion could be thought of as an alternate and complementary level of
analysi . Thus it was expected that although the impact of interest on
cognitive functions might be universal, the pecifics of what the individual child brings to his or her under tanding of task affordances (Gibson,
1966) might well vary as a function of personal experience. Such an
argumenc appear to have general upport in discussion of cognitive
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mapping (Neisser, 1976) and the child as craftsperson (Feldman, 1980);
although these discussions do not focus specifically on differences between individuals in the way in which information from the environment
is picked up and how it might impact on subsequent activity.
The present discussion of interest focuses on interest as an individually varying, but universal, psychological state. It draws on previous conceptions of interest to address three relatively applied aspects of childtask engagement. Specifically: (a) Do individual interests affect the way
in which children engage and learn from tasks with which they do have
experience? (b) Do children represent tasks (their demands and potentials) that are of interest to them differently than they do tasks that are
not of interest to them? (c) What is the effect of identified interests on a
child's subsequent task engagement or activity?
Such questions focus on the individual learner as co-constructing his
or her understanding, or theory (Carey, 1985) about the world, in conjunction with the objects and others that make up that world. Because of
the individual nature of this construction, it seems reasonable that although the underlying structures are probably universal, the particular
content of engagement may provide a specific function for the individual in terms of determining the kinds of questions with which he or she
has practice, the challenges he or she sets for him- or herself - in short,
the way he or she understands what it is that a task represents as possibilities for action. Specifically, if the kinds of things to which an individual
attends and the comprehension one has in attending are influenced by
what Piaget (1940) referred to as secondary interests (e.g., attractions,
novel learning), it seems reasonable to assume based on the work of early
theorists and the applied success of the psychometric approaches in
ascertaining particular differences in the content of individual interests,
that individual differences in interest may well have implications for
understanding how individuals engage (and learn from) tasks.
Discussions of experts and novices in particular content areas (e.g.,
Chi, 1978; Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982; Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979;
Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi, & Voss, 1979) have demonstrated the importance of domain-specific knowledge with respect to memory performance. These findings suggest that based on knowledge of a domain, it
can be expected that experts and novices will differ in performance.
Recent findings from Ericsson and Crutcher (in press) suggest, however,
that experts and novices in a domain generally do not differ in aptitude
or general reasoning. Rather than contradict each other, these findings
suggest that what may differ between the performance of experts and
novices in domains may not simply be knowledge. Instead, the difference may be explained by both the stored knowledge and value, or
interest, that the subject has for a particular domain. In other words,
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equating expertise with prior knowledge alone may be too simplistic an
explanation for differences in expert and novice performance.
Findings from case studies of persons learning computers and music
suggest that individuals who develop an interest in computers are more
inclined to reengage with computer tasks, and to persevere longer in
their task engagement than are those who do not report a developing
interest (Prenzel, 1988). In other words , the task is represented to the
self in such a way that an individual has predominantly positive emotions
toward this task (whether computers or music, or some other domain),
and if asked to compare this engagement with others in which the individual was involved , this task is ranked high in the individual hierarchy
of values (Schiefele, 1987). In this conceptualization, interest is a specific
"person-object relation" that includes an emotional as well as an affective component. The central feature of interest is its intrinsic character.
Knowledge is understood to develop in coordination with the positive
valence one holds for a particular object (task, etc.). With respect to
subsequent action, interest is conceptualized as "a scheme within a structure of valences, linking a multitude of individual valences of actions,
action outcomes, and consequences of action" (Schiefele, 1987). The
questions that form the basis of this approach to the study of interest are
questions of origins: how interest develops , and the characterization of
progress in learning that leads to classification as an expert or novice
relative to others working on the same task. Three aspects of the Educational Theory of Interest distinguish it from studies of experts and novices. First, this discussion of interest also includes a discussion of value.
Second, this discussion identifies individuals as varying by domain with
respect to the way in which knowledge emerges, rather than focusing on
learning of the task domain per se . Third, this discussion suggests that
individuals are reflectively aware of their interest(s).
In contrast, although the present discussion of interest focuses on
interest as involving both stored knowledge and value , and on the individual as co-constructing his or her understanding of tasks, it does not
address the way in which interests emerge, nor does it presume that
individuals are always reflectively aware of interest as a psychological
state. For the purpose of experimentation, the subject's engagement with
a task is considered to be reflected in individually identified objects of
interest and noninterest. As such, this approach to the study of interest
focuses on the role of interest (stored knowledge and value) and noninterest (knowledge and low value) in learning and subsequent task engagements. It assumes that the individual's present task engagements
reflect the way in which he or she has represented possibilities for action
to himself or herself, the kinds of questions posed, and the challenges to
which he or she responds.

Interests, representation, and activity

137

There is some precedent for discussing interdependence of subjecc
and task with respect to the way in which information is processed.
Eckblad (198 l) in particular, focuses on the importance of individual
contributions to task engagement in her discussion of scheme theory, the
relation between the schemes of a particular per on and a set of stimuli.
Eckblad reports that in all but one case, interesting stimuli were optimally arousing, being placed between complex and pleasant on a stimulus
dimension. These findings build on those that established optimal levels
of discrepancy in task presentation (e.g., Hunt, I 965) - that there are
particular points in attending to tasks when attention is heightened because of the difference that exists between the task as previou ly experienced and the task as presented (or represented). If interest as psychological state can be characterized as reflecting the kinds of optimally
discrepant po ibilities for action questions and challenges that individual set for themselves in continued engagement with an identified object
of interest, it seems reasonable to expect that studies where subjects
received tasks that were personally interesting and noninteresting might
significantly contribute to our existing under randing of child-task engagement, particularly individual difference in the processing of contents that children do learn. In addition, such finding would provide
insights for facilitating children's learning in domains (or aspects of domains), for which they do not have an identified interest.
To begin co map the role of intere t in what might best be described as
experimental learning (ongoing play with familiar play objects), the studies described here were designed to evaluate (a) subject-task engagement with respect co the effect of the individual's identified interests
across tasks assessing three dimensions of proce sing: attention, recognition, and recall memory; and (b) the role of both individual interests and
task affordances in representation of and activity with naturally occurring ta ks.
The studies reported here were designed to evaluate interest conceptualized a bot.h the stored knowledge and value an individual brings to
ubsequent engagemenl wit.h a task. They focus on tasks with which the
individual is already knowledgeable, and they do not presume that the
individual is aware that intere l. i influencing performance. In fact.,
identification of interest is based on naturally occurring task involvements of each individual studied, and is determined relative to that
individual's involvement with every task in which he or she is involved.
Three-year-old children were selected as the focus of the studies because: (a) they are not able to feign inten· t and are not experimenterwise; (b) they can follow directions necessary to follow up experimental
tasks · (c) they accommodate easily to videotaping ( o that identification
of interest could be based on ob erved behavior rather than elf-
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report); (d) competence was not acquired so quickly with any play object
that it wa not po sible to study their action in free play; and (e) the
nursery setting afforded the po ibility of studying children's actions in a
ontained environment.
Both tudies being discussed were condu ted using the same ample of
3-year-old children. The duldren were videotaped during free play at
nursery school over the econd term of their nursery school year. As such,
each of the 16 children (8 male , 8 females) was as familiar with each of the
l 6 available play objects and each of his or her peers as could be expected.
The videotapes were coded once to identify individual interests and
noninterests for each child. These identified interests were then employed to construct stimulus sets in the first study and to evaluate the role
of interest and noninterest in the children's actions in the second study.
Naturalistic identification of children's interests (and
noninterests)
Procedures

Following procedure outlined in Renninger and Wozniak (1985) six
videotapes, each 40 minute in length, were made of each child in free
play al nursery school. For purpo es of data reduction, each 40-minule
Lape was divided into 2.5-minute segments and the child' activity during
each segment was continuou ly coded in terms of the object, content, and
interpersonal nature of play. Thus, interest for a play object was determined by the quality and quantity of su tained attention maintained by
the child for 2.5 minutes or more across the videotaped play sessions.
For experimental purposes, children were identified a having an interest in a particular class of objects if, over the es ions of free play, they:
(a) returned to that obje t r peatedly; (b) pent more time playing with
that object than with ther play object ; (c) wottld at times play with that
object in solitary play; and (d) would at times play in other than manipulative pla with that objecL
Alternatively, play objects of the children were identified as noninterest if the child did have knowledge of the object but lacked value for
that object relative to the value demonstrated for objects of interest.
Thus, using the same procedure for data reduction as that used to identify children's interests, children were identified a having a noninterest
in a particular class of play objects it: over the videotaped play ession ,
they: (a) did spend time with these objects· (b) could use omething other
than manipulative play with the noninterest object; and (c) did not spend
a much time wi.th the e play objects as they did with their identified
objects of interest; and (d) did not play with the object in solitary play. (In
instances where more than one play object could have been identified as
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Older Children

Bear
Doll
Fire
Horse
Playdough
Purse
Rocket
Submarine
Train
Truck
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Younger Children
•

Male

!!a Female

Bear
Blocks
Car
Dishes
Doll
Fire
Horse
Puzzle
Train

1

2
1
3
Total Number of Children

2

3

Figure 6.1 Children's interests by age and sex. (Reprinted from Renninger
and Wozniak, 1985, by permission.)

a noninterest, a noninterest item was randomly selected from a pool of
potential noninterests by an adult unfamiliar with the experiment.)
Only those objects continuously available to all children were considered potential objects of interest and noninterest. Therefore, interest is
here discussed as being reflected in the experimental play behaviors of
children with the play objects available to them in the nursery school
setting.
Results and discussion

Two interests were identified for each child. Both of these were much
stronger for that child than were other potential play interests present in
the nursery environment. Findings regarding the content of children's
interests are presented in Figure 6.1. These findings indicate that: (a)
children's interests tend to be strong and relatively well focused; (b)
between children interests vary widely; (c) by ages 2.9 to 4.2 years, the
specific contents of the identified interests of boys and girls have almost
totally diverged, boys' interests being in general more heterogeneous
than those of girls; and (d) within this age range, older children as a
group have somewhat different interests than younger children.
Although children do tend to maintain attention to certain classes of
play objects in the environment longer and more frequently than they do
with other objects, one child's interests are not, as a rule, the interests of
other children. In fact, interests appear to vary widely. This dual characterization of interest as a psychological state on the one hand, and an
individual difference variable on the other, supports the early views of

I
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interest viewed previously and suggests that intensity of individual interest for text copic may in fact be a useful consideration in subsequent
studies of interestingness.
The variation in children's interests i even more striking when viewed
in relation o the range and type of interests chosen as a function of the
age and sex of the child . Among older children, males and females ea h
had the same number (5) of interests. However, thi pattern wa not
characteri tic of younger children's interest . The group of younger boys
had a larger number of interests (7) than did the group of younger girl
(3), which uggests that older girl may be more responsive to new interests at thi age and that boys may be solidifying their interest and thu
focu ing their attention more specifically than they had been previou ly.
(These findings are cross-sectional and ba ed on a ljmjted sampl of
d1ildren, and thus need to be con idered with some reservation.)
Although the girl in the older group had a few more interests than
those in the younger group, only two of all of the girl ' interests, horse
and play-dough, are not ex-stereotyped. The e interest were held only
by older girls. A contrasting tendency is present with respect to age and
type of boys' inter sts, however. The boys in the younger group were
somewhat less stereotypical in their choice of interests (blocks dishes,
horse, and puzzle) than the boys in the older group, who all chose sextereotypecl intere cs. Others such a Van Alstyne (1932) have noted
similar patterns of sex- tereotyped interests among this age group.
In contrast to the differences in direction of interest among children,
the relative trength of interest between children eem to be quite con istent. A liLtle boy with an interest in trruns may in general be expected to
b neither markedly more nor markedly less trongly interested in his
·ains than a litde girl with an intere t in bear will be interested in her
bears. From a constructivi t perspe tive, intere t could be said to reflect
the child's differential experienc with the environment, particularly
experience involving action on objects. As the child engages in play the
possibilities of action that the pani ular play object afford presumably
become more clear. Differences between the affordances of different
bjects and events, then, may provide the basi for a greater differentiation of attention (Gibson, I 966, 1979; ibson and Rader, 1979) and thu
greater differentiation of interest. Individual differences in the direction
of interest, then, reflect individual differences in the d1ildren's stored
knowledge and value.
As botJ1 Piaget ( 1940) and Vygotsky (1967) have suggested, interest
also reflects the child's value . Pre umably, as the child engages in action
with variou play objects and develops feelings of competence (White,
1959) with tho e objects, and a the child encounters object in ocial
contexts that enhance their value (Lewin, 1935; Mead, 1934), the child
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comes to feel positively toward them. It appears that regardless of the
particular direction (specific content) in which their interests take them,
young children will probably be highly motivated to engage objects of
interest in any situation in which they find them. This notion - that
interest would impel children to engage actively with particular play
objects - was a major premise of the two studies that follow.
Interest: attention, and memory

This study of the effect of interest on attentional shift, recognition, and
recall memory is detailed by Renninger and Wozniak (1985). It was
specifically designed as a mulLidimen ional, multitask analysis in which
the effect of imere t would be assessed across three processing situations.
The study was designed to a ess the performance of young children
across a set of related tasks that would permit evaluation of both levels of
processing, as well as within and between child differences on tasks as a
function of interest.
Based on the work of the early theorists, and in particular the work of
Arnold ( 1910) and Bartlett (1932), it was expected that interest would
affect attention and recall. Arnold argued that the relation between
attention and interest was reciprocal. He maintained that sustained attention led to the development of interest, and interest, in turn would
increase the likelihood of sustained attention. For the purposes of studying interest as a variable reflecting experience, however it seemed reasonable to expect that attentional shifts might in fact reflect attention to
objects of interest. Su h a possibility was implied by Turvey (1973) in his
di ·ussion f Lhe way in which individuals constantly monitor information being received in the peripheral visual field. pecifically, if individuals u e that part of experience which is not foca l to determine subsequent
shift in attentional focu , it might be expected chat when the pre ence of
an object of interest was indicated, attention would involuntarily shift in
the direction of that object.
Bartlett ( 1932) makes a similar point in discussing primacy-recency
effects in serial recall, stating that:
when material is arranged in erial order, items at th b ·ginning and at the end
occupy a favorable po iti n o far as clearness in recall goes. lL is of course no
psychological explanation merely to refer to po ition a an objective factor, and
to put the superiority down vaguely to greater xpendiLUre of"attention." There
i no aCLual evidence, and there eems to be no way of obtaining any evidence,
that in su h cases a greater amount of "attention," whatever this may be, is
expended .... In fact, p ition function i probably of diminishing importance
the funher we get from the non ense yllable type of memory work.
T he primary d terminant of relative clearne s in this series wa the functioning of preformed interests. (p. 56)
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According to Bartlett, recall performance improves as a function of the
meaningfulness of the stimuli to the subject. He also notes diminished
effects of order as tasks reflected such meaning. Thus, the hypothesis that
an identified object of interest placed in the middle serial position, that
position least likely to be recalled (Murdock, 1962), might in fact be recalled by young children was suggested by his findings. The recall portion
of this study also follows up on his suggestion that one might think about
the range of stimuli on a continuum the endpoints of which might be
labeled "nonsense" and "preformed interest." The preformed interest of
his study was a general group interest in World War II.
The present research extends Bartlett's research on interest by specifying individually meaningful stimuli - interests as individually assessed
based both on stored knowledge and on value. The hypothesis for this
aspect of this study, then, is based on the notion that interest is a specifically directed psychological state whose direction varies among individuals on the basis of their particular knowledge and value systems.
On the other hand, findings from study of young children's recognition
memory suggest that because recognition memory is so well developed by
3 years of age, children typically reach a ceiling in recognition tasks. Thus,
although interest might theoretically be expected to affect the way in
which items presented for recognition were processed, it was also anticipated that such effects might be difficult to isolate experimentally. As
such, it was anticipated that even if no effect of interest on recognition
memory could be determined, this task would provide an instructive contrast to the children's performance on the attention and recall tasks.
Procedures

Based on the naturalistic identification of interests, objects identified as
interests were embedded in experimental tasks that assessed attentional
shift, recognition, and recall. Objects of a given child's interest were
employed as that child's target stimuli in each task. For that same child,
the objects of every other child's interest were employed as comparison
stimuli. Thus, relative preference across children for objects of interest
was not , in general, preference for the same objects and cannot therefore be attributed to variations in stimulus salience. In both the recognition and recall tasks, additional "filler" objects were also employed to
provide context.
Because two objects of interest were identified for each child there
were two sets of stimuli for each group of children studied. In addition,
because there were two age groups involved in the study and these each
had somewhat different interests, interest differed by age. Objects for
the older group of children were: Set (1) horse, play-dough, purse,
rocket, train, and water-toys; and Set (2) bear, blocks, doll, fire hat, truck ,

......
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and submarine. Objects for the younger group were: Set (l) bear, book,
dishes, fire hat, horse, and train; and, Set (2) blocks, car, doll, paintbrushes, play-dough, and puzzle.
Two female adults, familiar to the children, collected all of the data. The
attention task was administered first, followed by the recognition and
recall tasks. The tasks were designed to evaluate whether the pickup as well
as the retrieval of information presented to young children would vary as a
function of individual differences in interest. Thus, the attentional shift
task consisted of a series of "interest wheels" in which the experimenter
presented pictures of identified objects of interest and noninterest to the
children's visual peripheral field. Shifts in eye gaze to these objects were
then recorded and analyzed for the presence of interest effects.
The recognition task consisted of a "birthday game" in which drawings
of interest and noninterest objects were shown to the children and then
presented in a novel context for free-choice recognition. In this task,
level of recognition and the order in which items were recognized were
recorded and evaluated. Finally, a modified version of Perlmutter and
M yers's ( 1977) recall task was used to present nine play objects from the
nursery school to the children for recall. The identified object of interest
was placed in the middle position (Position 5) of a series of identified
noninterest objects, and the children were asked to recall what they saw.
Overall level and order of recall were recorded and analyzed for the
presence of interest effects.
Results and discussion

Overall findings from this study suggest that: (a) Children's individual
interests exert a marked influence on shifts in focal attention to objects in
their peripheral visual field; (b) children's individual interests influence
both the likelihood that an item will be correctly recognized when encountered again and the likelihood that an incorrect filler item will be
falsely identified as previously encountered, at least within the particular
task emp loyed in Lhi tudy; and (c) ch ildren 's individual interests powerfully inAuence level of recall. So marked is this effect that recall of an
interest bject pla ·ed in that po ition (middle) generally least likely to be
recalled is (for older subjects) equal to or (for younger subjects) even
greater than recall of objects in that position (final) generally most likely
to be recalled.
More specifically, results of the task assessing attentional shift suggested that children are substantially more likely to shift fixation, and to
shift fixation first to an interest object than to comparison objects that
are of interest to other children. Moreover, no differences were found in
performance between trials indicating that the children's performance
was remarkably even .
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The potential implications of these findings are far-reaching. Processing of information from the peripheral visual field has been discussed as
an important determinant of where the eye looks next (Turvey, 1973).
There is, however, little research on the depth with which events in the
periphery are processed as the eye is guided in its search for information
necessary to adaptive action. The results of this portion of the study
provide a foundation for arguing that shifts in attention are influenced
not only by the perceptual characteristics of the peripheral objects or
events, but by the value they have for the subject. This would seem to
indicate that the children are processing peripheral stimulus information at a sufficient depth to be carrying out a process of evaluation, even
if it is one of which they are not reflectively aware. Such a suggestion
implies that although interest may influence the way in which knowledge
develops, it is a psychological state of which the subject may not be aware.
Finally, since no differences were found between the first and last trials
of the interest wheel, it appears that the influence of interest on the
direction of attentional shift is remarkably consistent phenomena. Interest, then, is not only a strong determinant of shifts in attention but also
remains so over multiple encounters with the same situation.
Results of the recognition task mirror those of the attentional shift
task. These findings suggest that children are more likely to recognize a
given interest item and to choose a given interest item first than they are
to recognize items of noninterest or to choose them first. Furthermore,
when children make false positive recognitions, they are much more
likely to involve items judged as related to their interests than would be
expected by chance, or excitedly to mislabel objects as involving their
identified object of interest. Thus, for example, a child identified as
having an interest in trains, exclaimed, "What a long train," when presented with a filler item depicting a fishing rod.
Presumably, when children are shown an interest item embedded in a
context of other items, they are more likely to attend to it and, possibly,
to attend to it more closely. On recognition trials, in which the same item
is embedded in a different context, the close attention children have paid
to the item during the original presentation may facilitate the likelihood
that it will be recognized, that is, that the children will experience a sense
of familiarity with it on the second encounter.
It should be noted, however, that given the nature of the recognition
task, another alternative is at least conceivable. The task is constructed so
that the children are asked to help another child choose those items from
among a larger set that were the toys the other child had received for his
or her birthday. If the children projected their own desires onto the task,
the high rate of interest items selected might as much reflect personal
desire for those items as it does recognition of the items as belonging to
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the original set. The tendency for false positive recognitions to be associated with interest items could also reflect such an effect. On the other
hand, levels of recognition are generally high for this age group (Brown
& Campione, 1972; Brown & Scott, 1971; Corsini, Jacobus, & Leonard,
1969; Perlmutter & Myers, 1974) and should limit this type of effect. In
addition, the results of the recall task suggest that young children are
capable of recalling the presence of an interest object from a set of
comparison objects. Thus, it stands to reason that if recall is possible particularly because this age group has been characterized as limited in
recall (Perlmutter & Lange, 1978) - recognition as a perceptual judgment of familiarity is certainly possible. Taken together, the findings for
the recognition task suggest that, like attentional shift, recognition is
powerfully influenced by interest.
Results of the recall task demonstrated differences in recall with respect to serial position (interest and recency) and, to a much lesser extent, age. First, older children tended to have higher overall levels of
recall than did younger children, although this effect did not quite reach
statistical significance. Second, younger children manifested a considerably weaker recency effect than did the older children. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the interest effect manifested by the level of
recall for objects in Position 5 was strong for all children. For younger
subjects, Position 5 had the highest level of recall, greater even than the
level of recall for Position 9, the recency position. For older subjects, the
level of recall for Position 5 was roughly equivalent to that for Position 9,
but recall for these two positions was superior to all other positions.
Because this study represents a variation on that of Perlmutter and
Myers (1979), it is instructive to contrast these findings with those which
they reported. The first finding of higher overall recall for older subjects
is consistent with that of Perlmutter and Myers. The fact that this finding
did not reach statistical significance in this study, whereas it did in the
Perlmutter and Myers research, probably reflects the fact that Perlmutter
and Myers studied two more widely separated age groups (2.9 to 3.1 and
3.8 to 4.8 years of age) than were involved in this investigation (2.9 to 3.5
and 3.6 to 4.2 years of age).
The second finding, that the recency effect for younger children was
weaker than that for older children, does not parallel that of Perlmutter
and Myers, who found no differences between age groups as a function
of serial position. It seems possible that this difference may be explained
by the relative strength of the interest effect for the younger group younger children manifested the highest level of recall for interest objects, objects at Position 5. Under the assumption that younger children
have an overall recall limitation of 1 to 3 objects (as is also indicated by
these data), high levels of recall for Position 5 brought about by systemati-
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cally introducing an interest object into that position may have directly
reduced the capacity available for recall of objects in the recency position.
This line of reasoning is supported by the presence of an age difference in intrusions noted by the ob erver during the testing. Half of the
older children mentioned that their identified object of interest was not
in the box, while younger children typically included an interest object in
their recall just as though the object had actualJy been present during the
given trial - even when that particular intere t object wa not part of that
timulu set. Pos ibly, younger children, thinking globa lly in terms of
"toy " when asked what was in the box, imply mentioned a favorite toy namely their in terest objecL It is consistent with thi that no objects ocher
than objects identified previously as interest bjects were observed to
occur as intrusions.
The third finding, which recall of Position 5 was high and, for younger
children, even higher than that for Position 9, is in marked contrast to
that of Perlmutter and Myers's finding that low levels of recall occurred
for all except the recency position.
Clearly, children's interest in the object of interest greatly inAuenced
the likelihood that it would be recalled. Perlmutter and Myers have
sugge ted that improvement in r call for serial po ition other than the
last requires the development of rehearsal strategy and increased general knowledge brought about by hildren 's expanding experience with
the world. It eems reasonable that both of these factors do, in fact,
contribute to improved recall as children develop. However, the re ults
of the pre em tudy uggest that the development of rehearsal strat gies
may not be necessar for recalling an object in the middle ·erial p sition
when the object in that position is an identified object of interest.
In this particular task, the presence of intere t effects sugge ts that, by
age 3 enough knowledge ha been acquired with re pect to a class of
play objects that the potential action and challenges particular to that
class of play object have b gun to characterize individual children'
evolving knowledge tructures and erve to differentiate the specific
content of their knowledge base from that of other children . Thu ,
intere t might be aid to inform the dffferentiation f perception and, in
Lum, the quality of recall.
Furthermore differential performance by the hildren with respect to
identified objects of interest sugge t that the experimental use of toys as
timulus objects for young children in recall needs to be reevaluated.
Typicality of "toy" for a particular age group is not the ame as interest in
a given toy. Although a similar point has been made with respect to adu lt
ategoriiaLion (Malt & Smith, 1982), "toys' have generally been con idered very appropriate and relatively similar stimuli for the study of
young children.
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Findings from this study of the effect of interest on attention and
memory indicate that interest exerts a marked influence on attentional
shift, recognition, and recall memory among young children. In fact,
interest is so influential in the performance of children on these tasks
that they shifted eye gaze to their identified items of interest first, and
described these objects first on both the recognition and recall tasks.
Clearly, if interest is such a powerful influence on performance, then it
might be expected that study of these children's actions in free play
would begin to provide insights about the way in which interest gates the
kinds of possibilities for action these children represent to themselves
and on which they subsequently act.
Interest, representation, and action

In the previous study, interest was employed as a dependent variable and
its effect on attentional shift, recognition, and recall memory of young
children was evaluated. Findings indicate not only that interest affects
attentional shift, recognition, and recall memory, but that its effect is so
overwhelming that no particular distinctions emerged between these
three dimensions of children's processing. Thus, given observations of
children's actions in free play that suggested there are substantial differences in their activity, it was anticipated that by specifying contrasts between interest and noninterest with respect to value, and by focusing on
the structure of children's actions, it might be possible to evaluate further the role of interest (and noninterest) in children's task engagement.
To avoid conflation of knowledge and interest effects, noninterest was
conceptualized as involving knowledge and low value. To avoid a confound between aptitude for performance with particular objects and
identified objects of interest and noninterest, identified objects of interest and noninterest were individually identified for each child relative to
that child's play with all available play objects, and were then studied
relative to the mean proportion of their behaviors with these identified
objects of interest and noninterest. Finally, to facilitate evaluation of
child-task engagement as a function of interest and not simply the probability that some play objects actually afforded more possibilities for action than did others, a modal task affordance for each play object with
respect to each of the variables studied was calculated based on all of the
children's play actions. This rating was then employed as an independent variable in analyses. Thus, based on the assumption that children's
actions in free play reflect their understanding of possibilities for action
with those play objects (or at least the way in which they are able to carry
out their understanding of these possibilities), the present study was
designed to address the way in which different types of experience gate
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the content that children represent to themselves through evaluating
children's play actions with those objects as a function of interest, task
affordance, and gender.
In discussing current work on event presentation, Nelson ( 1986) notes
that one of the assumptions underlying this research has been that "differences in initial perceptual representations imply differences in derived
structures as well as in cognitive performance" (p. 17). She continues to
suggest that because "schemas in part guide perception, perceptual representation of the same event may differ for children to the extent that their
schemas for that event differ" (p. 17). In other words, Nelson suggests that
there are individual understandings of events that deviate from the event
representations the individual eventually will develop. Given that interest
appears to affect attention and memory of young children powerfully,
and that the specific contents of children's interests vary as they do, it
seemed reasonable to suggest that in addition to the similarities that characterize the development of young children's understanding of "events,"
there may be some fairly systematic differences in this development as
well. In order to investigate the possibility that children's interests might
differentially influence their representation of tasks (and subsequently
their activity), this study was designed to evaluate children's play across
objects available in their nursery school classroom .
Procedures

The videotaped free play of each of the 16 children (8M, 8F) who were
subjects of the previous study was independently reanalyzed to identify
each child's actions with each of 16 play objects continuously available to
the children. Following this, children's actions with those objects identified previously as interests and noninterests were evaluated as a function
of value (interest and noninterest), task affordance, and gender.
Identification of children's actions with objects involved continuous
coding of all tapes of each child in free play. Coding consisted of: (a)
identifying the object of play, (b) the type of play, as well as (c) the
particular action (within type of play) as these occurred. All data including duration of each data point were recorded by computer.
Although the specific actions with which children engage with discrete
play objects may vary, observation of children's behaviors indicate that it is
possible to describe the type(s) of play in which the child is engaged and
types of play to which a child might shift in play across their play with each
of the available play objects. To facilitate comparison of children's play
across play objects (trains, dolls, etc.), a taxonomy of play types was developed, based on observations conducted using another sample of children
playing in the same classroom with the same play objects as those employed in this study. The taxonomy identifies the structural features of
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children's actions with play objects. The types of play described by this
taxonomy include: investigative, functional, operational, transformational, and facilitative play (Renninger, 1984). Each of these types of play
is thought to reflect the child's exploration of challenge-setting, and as
such different dimensions of child-task engagement. 4
In investigative play, children's actions are described as reflecting exploration of the physical attributes of an object. Thus, for example, in
investigative train play a child might drop the train, push it sideways, or
play with the coupler. The kinds of challenge with which the child is
thought to be engaging in investigative play, then , involve explora tion of
new options for play with the object, features with which the child has
not previously been engaged. In functional play, children are described as
continuing to explore the properties of a class of objects, but this exploration reflects convention. Thus, in functional train play a child might
hook cars together, push the train (engine first), or load and unload the
train. In functional play children demonstrate a culturally consistent
understanding of what is and is not a train. The kinds of challenges with
which children are thought to be engaging include mimicking and making connections between their play and the functional uses of these
objects in the larger world in which they live.
In operational play, children's actions are sometimes described as exploration, but this exploration is generally described as reflecting preoccupation with relations such as: counting, dividing, ordering, and so on.
Superficially, children's play may appear to be either investigative or
functional; however, continuous monitoring of the play often reveals
repetition of sequencing, counting, dividing, adding, subtracting, balancing, or attention to regularities of motion. For example, in operational
train play the child might: connect and disconnect cars repeatedly, get
down to eye level with the train, and pull it forward and backward while
focusing on the wheels; or order the cars by size, color, and the like.
Thus, the kinds of challenges with which the child is thought to be
engaging include exploring and developing an understanding of systematic or programmatic action.
In transformational play, children's actions are described as reflecting
the use of one object to represent another object. In transformational
train play, a child might make tickets out of paper, use a line of chairs to
denote a train, or step out of a large rocking boat and announce, "We're
at the train station, Bill." Train is the object of play even though there are
no trains or model trains being used. The challenges the child is thought
to be engaging in transformational play involve maintaining the flow of
an image in play. This requires substituting something else as the "object" when it is not available.
Finally, in facilitative play, the object is generally described as supporting children's actions in other play areas. In facilitative train play, the
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train might be carri.e d to the easels and placed on a nearby window
ledge. A child might paint, and when finished pick up the train and
move with it to another play area. The challenges fo r the child in facilitative play are thought to include the ability to divide attention between
objects, and separating from an object that provides security (Cay &
Hyson, 1976).
Identification of particular actions within each type of play refers to
what the child was doing. Thus, one child's investigative play with trains
might involve holding the engine upside down and spinning one wheel
and then another wheel, whereas another child's investigative play with
trains might include pushing a train with one car sideways, stopping the
pushing motion, pushing again, and then reorganizing the way the train
was connected so that the wheels would allow the train to be pushed
more smoothly.
All shifts in action were also coded, so that it was possible to evaluate
the sequence of the child's actions both between and within play objects.
Thus, fo r example, "pushing the train" and "stopping the pushing motion" would count as two actions. An action sequence might include:
"pushing the train," "stopping the train," "pushing the train," "reorganizing the connections," and would be considered a repeated action sequence if it were employed by the child more than once.
This coding of children's play actions contrasts with that for identification of interests a nd noninterests in which the only play evaluated was
that with objects that lasted for 2.5 minutes or longer. It further contrasts
with the identification of objects of interest and noninterest in that it
focuses on the process of the child's engagement with each play object.
In this way it is possible to compare, for example, th e individual child's
investigative play with one play object with his or her investigative play
with another play object.

Resul/J and discussion
Child ren's actions in free play with each play object were evaluated with
respect to each of the following variables: frequency and duration of
play; number of types of play; shifts between types of play; number of
shi fts in action within each type of play; number of shifts between actions
within level for each type of play; and repetition of action sequences. For
the purposes of analysis, these data were employed in two ways. First,
modal scores of all children's play with each play object were determined. On the basis of these scores each.object was rated high or low on
affordances for each of the variables under study. Then, based on the
individually identified objects of interest and noninterest reported earlier, a score for object affordances specific to the identified object of
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interest and the identified object of nonintere t for that child was entered into analyses as an independent variable. Following this, and independent of the identification of each child's imere t and nonincerest,
cores for each variable were calculated for each child's play with his or
her identified objects of interest and nonincerest.
Results from 2 (value: interest or noninterest) x 2 (object affordances: high or low) x 2 (gender: male or female) repeated measures
analyses of variance reveal that: (a) children are no more likely to play
with objects identified as interests than noninterests, although they are
more likely to play for longer periods of time with objects identified a
interests than those identified as noninterests; (b) children are more
likely to use more types of play with objects identified a interests than
they are with objects identified as noninterests. Additionally, hildren
are more likely to use more varying types of play with those objects
affording more varying type of play (e.g. play-dough) than they are on
those object which were rated low on the pos ibility of employing a lot
of different a lion in play (e.g. trains); (c) hildren are more likely to
shift between types of play with objects identified as interest than with
those identified as noninterests; (d) children are mor likely to employ
more actions in play with objects of interest than with objects identified
as noninterests; (e) children are more likely to employ more shifts in
actions with objects identified as interests than with objects identified as
noninterests; (f) children are more likely to repeat particular sequences
of action with their identified object of interest than with objects of
nonintere t; (g) children who hared the same identified object of interest did not nece arily share the same action equences in play with their
identified object of interest; (h) children in play with object identified
as noninterests are more likely either not to repeat prior action within
play types or only to repeat prior actions with no incorporation of
change in their action sequences.
In general, Lhen, findings from this study suggest a powerful and
consistent effect of interest on children's play actions. That children
w re not engaged in play with their identified objects of interest any
more frequently than Lhey were with their identified objects of nonilllerest further corroborates thac noninterest reAe ts a variation of the
quality of children' engagement with play objects and i not ·imply
reflecting a lack of knowledge for that play object. On the ocher hand, it
is interesting that although the children are playing no more frequently
with object of intere c, they are in fact playing with identified objects of
interest for longer p ri ds of time than with identified objects of noninterest. This uggests that the children may ee more possibilities for
action with their identified obj ccs of incere t and that they are better
able to recall prior actions with these objects and in engagement are in
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fact setting challenges for themselves that vary from those they set for
themselves with their identified objects of noninterest.
Clearly, main effects that indicate interest is a determinant of the
number of types of play, shifts between types of play, number of shifts in
action within each type of play, number of shifts between actions within
level for each type of play, and repetition of action sequences all suggest
that the children are in fact engaging differently with their identified
objects of interest than with their identified objects of noninterest. If we
can assume that the children's actions reflect what they re-present to
themselves as possibilities for actions, then it seems reasonable to argue
that the content of representation not only varies between individuals
but does so in a consistent and reliable way across several types of children's play actions - at least with respect to individually identified objects of interest. In fact, differences in the quality of children's repeated
actions with objects identified as interests and noninterests, as well as the
finding that suggests that children who shared the same interests did not
necessarily share the same repeated sequences of action, further suggests
that individual interests may guide and regulate the individual's subsequent representation and activity.
In order to study further the role of value, affordance, and gender in
children's actions, analyses specific to each identified play type were conducted as well. Findings from study of children's actions in investigative
play (focus on an object's physical attributes) reveal: (a) females are most
likely to re-engage in investigative actions and to shift actions with their
identified objects of interest - these objects of interest also are most likely
to be objects which afford the most possibilities for actions and shifts of
action in investigative play; (b) all children spend the most time in facilitative play with identified objects of interest that are also objects affording
possibilities for the longest actions. In addition, females are most likely to
play the longest with objects which are identified as objects of interest and females are most likely to play the longest with objects that afford
possibilities for actions that last the longest; and (c) all children have more
different types of investigative actions with objects identified as interests
than those identified as noninterests. In addition, females are more likely
to play with objects that afford the most possibilities for investigative play.
Given that the kinds of challenges with which children engage in investigative play include exploration of new options for play with the object,
physical characteristics of the object with which the child has previously
been engaged , the present findings can be interpreted as suggesting that
in investigative play all children are employing more different types of
actions or more different types of challenges and questions, and they
persevere with these challenges longer when playing with objects identified as interests than when playing with objects identified as non-
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interests. However, these findings further suggest that females may be
more disposed both to play with objects that afford novel challenges and
to set novel challenges for themselves in free play than are males.
In contrast, findings from study of children's actions in functional play
(focus on conventional use of the object) suggest: (a) all children have the
most repeated engagements, lasting the longest periods of time, and the
most shifts in action in functional play with their identified objects of
interest; (b) males are most likely to have the most different types of
actions in functional play with their identified objects of interest, which
also are most likely to be objects that afford the most possibilities for
action in functional play.
Given that the kinds of challenges with which children engage in functional play include exploration of relations between their play and the
functions of their play objects in the larger world, the present findings
can be interpreted as suggesting that in functional play children are
more likely to have picked up on the cues provided by their environment
about typical uses of their identified objects of interest than of their
identified objects of noninterest. In addition, male children are more
likely to incorporate actions that mimic those of the larger world in their
play with identified objects of interest, and their identified objects of
interest afford more possibility of conventional play than do those of
female children. Taken together with findings from study of children's
investigative play, it appears that, at least in the sample studied, female
children are more likely to engage in and to play with objects that provide novel challenges, whereas male children are more likely to engage
in and to play with objects that provide more opportunities for mimicking the larger world.
Findings from study of children's actions in operational play (focus on
such relations as counting, sequencing, etc.) suggest further that: (a) all
children re-engage with objects and shift actions most frequently to objects identified as interests during operational play. In addition, those
objects most frequently engaged in operational play are most likely to be
objects that afford the most possibilities for action and the most possibilities for shifts in action in operational play; (b) all children engaged in the
longest periods of play in operational play with their identified objects of
interest; (c) females are most likely to have the most different types of
actions in operational play with their identified objects of interest, which
also are most likely to be objects that afford the most possibilities for
different actions in operational play.
Given that the kinds of challenges with which children engage in operational play include exploring and developing an understanding of systematic and programmatic action, findings from the present study can be
interpreted as suggesting that in operational play children are most likely

154

K. A. RENNINGER

to re-engage obj cts identified a interests, and to do so for longer p riods. ln addition female chjldren are more likely to employ more different
kind of relation in cheir operational play than are male ch ildren and are
more likely co play with objects that provide more po ibiljtie for expl ring the e relation . Not only are these female more inclined t engage in
novel challenge setting, as suggested by their inve tigacive play, but they
are also likely to explore the pos ibl relations in play with their identified
obje t ofinterest, and they eek out obje cs that enable them to have more
possibilities for such engagement.
Findings from tudy o[ children' action in lran {onnational play (focu
on repre entation of the object) suggest: (a) females are most likely to
have the most repeated en agements in transformational play with their
identified bjectS of int re t, which also are most likely to be objects that
afford the mo t repeated engagement in transformational play; (b) all
hildren hav the longest engag m nl in transfonnational play with
the ir identified objects of interest, all children hav the longe t engagements in transformational play with objeccs that afford the most possibilities for long engagements; (c) males ar mo t likely to shift actions within
level in transformational play with identified object of interest which
al o are most likely to afford the most likelihood of shifts in action within
tran formational play; (cl) all children use the most different types of
a tion in transfonnati nal play with their identified object of interest,
which a re also th most likely to be object thac afford the most different
type ' of action in transformational play.
iven that the kind of challenges with which hildr n ngage in transformational play require maintaining the Aow of an image in play
through substituting another obje t for the "obj ct" when it is not available, findings from the pre ent tudy can be interpreted as sugge ting
that child ren are most likely to image or transform object co represent
their identified object of interest. In particular, female · are most likely
to hav the mo t rep atecl engagements in tran formationa l play and to
play with o~jects that facilitate the mo t possibilitie of repeated engagements. Males, on the other hand, are most likely to hift a ·tion in their
transformational play with bje t identihed a imere t , and these obj cts afford the most possibilitie for shifting of a tions in transformational play. That the f erna le in thi sample are able to have the most
repeated engagements in tran formational play and to elect obj cts for
play that permit more repeated engagements uggests that the females
in this sample may g nerally be more focused on repeated opp rtunitie
to image than are the males although the males, when in transformational play, ar more likely actually to engage in more different kind of
actions. These findings complement tho e indicating chat male children
also engaged in more different kinds of functional play than did the
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female children. It appears that because the males engage in a greater
range of actions in functional play and seek out object that facilitate a
greater range of actions in functional play, in tran formational play their
shifting actions reflect this repertoire of functional actions in the possibilities they have for play with objects in transformation. The females, on
the other hand, with their tendency to explore novel challenges (investigative play) and types of relations (operational play) may repeatedly
engage in transformational play as another challenge but do not bring an
established repetoire of particular actions to their transformational play
behavior.
Findings from study of children's actions in facilitative play (focus on
the object as supporting play with another object) reveal: (a) all children
engage in facilitative play most frequently with identified objects of interest; (b) children do not differ in the time they allot to facilitative play with
identified objects of interest and noninterest; (c) all children are most
likely to shift between actions in facilitative play with identified objects of
interest, which are also most likely to be objects that afford the most
possibilities for shifting of action in facilitative play.
Given that the kinds of challenges with which children engage in facilitative play include the ability to divide attention between objects and to
separate from an object that provides ecurity, findings from the present
. tudy suggest that children in facilitative play with their identified objects
of interest are most. likely to engage objects of interest and to employ a
range of actions in their play with these object in facjlitative play, even
though they do not engage in facilitative play with identified objects of
interest for longer periods of time than they engage identified object'> of
noninterest. It appears that although the children have more capacity to
engage in facilitative play with objects of interest and do so more frequently than with objects of noninterest, they do not actually engage in
facilitative play for longer periods of time with their identified objects of
interest becau e their value for these objects may actually distract them
from the other objects with which they have been occupied.
In summary, findings from this study of children's actions in free play
indicate that children's interests influence their representation of possibilities for action, and presumably their subsequent activity because this
activity in all likelihood will also reflect their intere ts. Leont'ev (19 I)
observed that activity er es "to orient the subject in a world of objects .. . activity is .. . a system with its own tructure, its own internal
transformations, and its own development" (p. 46). In the present study,
children's actions with respect to their own identified objects of interest
and noninterest indicate that interests serve to increase the likelihood of
particular engagement and the kinds of challenge setting such engagement makes possible. These findings further suggest that differences in
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the specific content of interest may in fact be influencing the aspect or
affordances of play objects to which the child attends, with which the
child engages, and what the child does in play with that object in subsequent activity. Thus, at least for children at 3 years of age, the activity of
particular engagement may have a unique structure that reflects individual interests.
In his discussion of the development of representational competence,
Sigel ( 1986) notes that children need first to conserve the meaning of the
object to be represented, and following this they develop the capacities to
make a plan (anticipate), to use hindsight (hindsight), and to go beyond
present action (transcendence). Findings from the present study indicate
that children as young as 3 years of age are developing abilities to repeat
challenges for themselves, through the types of play in which they engage. Specifically, they are exploring manipulable aspects of the object's
physical properties (investigative play); connections between their play
and actions of their milieu (functional play); possibilities for systematic
action (operational play); substituting one object for another (transformational play); and dividing attention (facilitative play). That these children
distinguish between interest and noninterest objects in their engagement
in each type of play suggests that these children are making choices
(anticipating); drawing on experience (hindsight); and considering alternative possibilities for action (transcendence) in their play- at least with
identified objects of interest - regardless of whether these actions are
reflective or not. Their ability to represent to themselves information
that subsequently influences activity requires a general ability to think
about an object in two different ways at the same time. This ability
appears to emerge first in play with identified objects of interest.
Furthermore, it appears that children are equally flexible with respect
to their actions in play with objects identified as interests and equally
inflexible with respect to their actions in play with objects identified as
noninterests. Such findings provide a complement to those of Nelson and
Gruendel ( 1986), who found in their study of 4- to 8-year-olds that older
children were more likely to evidence both increased structural complexity in scripts and flexibility in describing strategies. The present study
suggests that at least with respect to individual interests and noninterests,
the actions of children differ between domains as a function of value and
in some instances as a function of what the possibilities for action with
that play object may be. Whatever the specific content of representation,
it varies in a consistent way such that there is increased structural complexity in their play with objects identified as interests. What is less clear is
the extent to which such actions have been internalized as procedural
responses to particular objects and as such reflect unconscious reactions
rather than emerging planfulness in children's activity.
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Findings that suggest that children in play with identified objects of
interest repeat patterns of action and incorporate new actions into these
patterns indicate that children probably are not simply reacting to objects identified as interests but are evidencing an emerging planfulness.
That children continue co re-engage their identified objects of interest,
to repeat particular patterns of action that also incorporate systematic
variations in these actions, and that these actions vary even when children share the same identified objects of interest, further suggests not
only that the children are responding to the challenges the play object
affords, but that they are setting challenges for themselves with these
play objects that build on prior activity.
On the other hand, findings that indicate differences between children with respect to their actions in play as a function of gender, suggest
that the specific form of their activity is probably a response to the others
in their class, as well as the larger system of social relations of which they
are also a part. What is of particular importance to the present discussion
is the role of interest in the development of children's understanding.
That systematic differences emerge between children with respect to the
content of their interests, and then again with respect to the structure of
their play with their interests when analyzed by play type, indicates that
the influence of gender might be best understood as embedded in,
rather than causally connected to, the content of individual interests. At
very least, such differences suggest that there may be several kinds of
"interests" that might be usefully studied.
Conclusions

There are probably more similarities than there are differences in the
way in which individuals process information. However, differences that
do exist between children in the way they understand the tasks with
which they are presented and how they then proceed to accomplish these
tasks are major stumbling blocks for both the child and those with whom
they work. The literature is replete with findings suggesting the importance of meaningfulness, typicality, centrality, familiarity, and th.e like for
the way in which individuals perform. These studies all attest to the
importance of the tasks with which subjects are presented, although most
such studies have grouped subjects together in order to describe individual contributions to subject-task engagement. In the present studies, by
controlling for differences between children with respect to the content
of their individually identified interest, and by employing mean proportions to evaluate differences between children in their actions with both
interest and noninterest objects, it was possible to begin to evaluate the
role of interest in the development of children as individuals. Findings
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from these studies indicate that individually identified interests and
noninterests do affect the way in which children engage and perform on
tasks requiring attention and memory, the way in which children represent the demands and potentials for tasks that are of interest to them,
and what the child stores in the way of information for subsequent
activity.
Furthermore, it appears that in experimental play (ongoing play with
familiar objects) children have the most access to and more likelihood of
storing information pertaining to objects identified as interests. The
patterns of these children's activity between domains suggests an individual organization of activity that is guided and regulated by interest. To
the extent that action outcomes, such as focus, type, and shifting of play
actions, can be construed as evidence of an emerging planfulness, young
children's specific organization also might be conceptualized as schematic. Whether such a scheme would take on a "structure of valences" as
Schiefele ( l 98 7) suggests, is a question that the present studies only
begin to address.
Krapp and Fink (l 986) have reported that the pattern of children's
actions with their interests, conceptualized as preferred person-object
relationships, is maintained during the transition from the family into
kindergarten , although which actions will be observed across time is not
predictable. Rather, they find a high probability of determining reliable
post hoc connections between present and past patterns of actions on a
case-by-case basis. Such findings, together with those of the present studies suggesting that interests might be considered to reflect the kinds of
questions and challenges the individual represents to himself or herself
in engagement with an object (task, etc.), suggest that interest might be
most appropriately conceptualized as embedded in the way in which the
individual engages subsequent activity. This would explain why simple
correspondences between patterns of action across environments are not
easily made, and why two children in play with the same object are not
necessarily involved in the same actions even when observed for long
periods, over the course of an entire term at nursery school.
In discussing scene schema, Mandler (1979, 1983) notes that they are
integrated into the knowledge structure and inform what it is that comes
to be expected. In particular, what is known about the schema and what
is anticipated "provide a great deal of economy in our processing of the
surround [meaning] that much of what we think we have actually seen,
we have only inferred" (1983, p. 454). This echoesjames's (1890) discussion of interest and suggests an extension that includes information that
is presumed or inferred, information that informs (whether accurately
or not) subsequent activity.
In the attentional shift task reported in the first study, children were
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more likely to shift their gaze toward an object identified as an interest
when it was projected in their peripheral visual field. Findings from this
study were discussed as reflecting the perceptual characteristics of the
peripheral objects as well as the value of these objects for the child.
Together with findings from study of children's actions in play, it appears that the children in the present studies have internalized a process
of evaluating the objects available to them in nursery school and this
influences their subsequent engagements, whether these are explicit
tasks of recognition and recall, or more implicit tasks involving subsequent action in free play.
Findings from the present studies further suggest that in addition to
access of information that interests provide children, information stored
about identified objects of interest and its concomitant influence on the
process of children's representation for subsequent activity should be
acknowledged as well. Although train play, for example, involves many
actions shared across children, it also varies between children. In fact,
the kinds of actions in which a child engages in train play are not necessarily the same actions as those of the next child, even if the train is an
identified object of interest for both children.
Findings from the studies presented appear to suggest that the kinds
of play objects for which children have an interest influence the kinds of
possibilities for subsequent action, or challenges that the children set for
themselves in response to these possibilities. They also suggest that children seek out play objects that match the kinds of challenges with which
they feel comfortable. An important question for the present discussion
is whether the challenges being posed by two children in play with trains
are qualitatively different, and what the implications of such differences
might be for thinking about the role of specific content in representation
and the implications of individual variation in interests for understanding children's development.
Based on the present findings, it might be expected that two children
in train play would engage qualitatively different kinds of challenges if
train play were an identified object of interest for one child but not for
the other child. Whether the child for whom train play was not an
identified interest might be expected to be exploring similar challenges
in play with his or her identified object of interest is another question.
Findings from the second study presented suggest this is probably the
case. On the other hand, given findings that suggest that particular play
objects afford more possibilities for some actions than others, it may be
that the specific class of objects of interest to children do influence the
kinds of challenges with which they engage. It should be pointed out,
however, that children in the present study are engaging on a regular
basis with their identified interests and noninterests, along with a variety
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of other play objects. Thus, if they are limited in the challenges with
which they engage, this is not because of a lack of alternate sources of
possibilities and challenges in the environment and can be attributed to
self-imposed constraints.
At present, interest as an individually varying, psychological state can
be said to account for and may well contribute to differences between
young children in both representation and subsequent activity. lt appears there is an individual quality to representation involving both the
kinds of possibilities that are more characteristic of an object and the
process of representing and re-presenting information about a class of
objects. Whether children' interests influence only the content of information that is processed, or whether interest might be more appropriately considered to have chemelike properties that influence the representational process, dearly needs further research. From either of these
perspectives, interest appears to be an important reflection of, and
source of, individual differences in task engagement.
However, some basic questions about the role of interest in the development of children need to be addressed. Interest appears to serve a particular function for young children by focusing, developing skills, schooling
attention to particular features of tasks, and on the basis of these facilitating the setting of challenges fo1· the child that are optimally discrepant.
However, interest does not appear to have such a pervasive effect on
information processing among older children. Findings from studies of
fifth- and sixth-grade students' ta k engagement in reading and mathematic ta ks (where the context of passage and word problem interest and
noninterest was manipulated), for example, suggest that interest serves to
influence comprehension of the task but not the kill requi ite to such
tasks (Renninger, I 988). Furthermore, it eems reasonable that once a
studem is more metacognitively able, and can acknowledge the influence
of int rest on activity, it may be possible for him or her to develop strategies to overcome the influence of interest (and noninterest).
Clearly, longitudinal evaluation of individual children's actions in free
play should further knowledge aboul the importance of particular content and specific configurations of possi bilities (Piaget, 1987) or challenges that characterize children' task engagement and the extent to
which they could be said to vary as a function of intere t. It would also
permit evaluation of shifts in interest over time and determination of
whether they are most appropriately identified with objects or perhaps
more appropriately idencified with possibilities afforded by particular
engagements. On the other hand , case studies and protocol analyses of
individuals on casks allowing manipulation of interest and noninterest
would offer additional insights about access to, and storage of, information that characterizes individual performance across tasks.

Interests, representation, and activity

161

The present findings provide strong support for the influence of identified objects of interest on the way in which young children subsequently re-engage them. The implications of such repre entations for
children' development longitudinally is a topic for further re earch. At
this time, it appears that both researchers and practitioners can benefit
from recognizing the power of young children's interests with respect to
task engagement, appreciating that the task with which individual children may understand themselves to have been presented may not have
been the task that was intended. As such, programs involving either
research on or practice with young children would do well to account for
and accommodate to the role of individual interests in children's representation and subsequent activity.
NOTES

The research reported in Lhis chapler has been upporced thrnugh grants from
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studie presented.
l Play object or simply object is used throughout this manuscript to refer to the
class of object or events with which children might engage in a nursery school
class. Thus object could refer to a doll , dramatic play, play-dough, or traiJJS
among other obje ts.
2 R printed with permission of Macmillan Publishing Company from Democracy
and Educatioll by john Dewey. Copyright 1916 by Macmillan Publishing Company, renewed 1944 by John Dewey.
3 From Six Psychological Studies, by Jean Piaget, translated by Anita Tenzer. Copyright © 1967 by Random House, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
4 This list is not, however, considered LO be an exhaustive list of possible play types.
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